Students of basic political science are taught that in a government system patterned after the American model, and the one in the Philippines is an example, power is divided among three branches of government—the executive, the legislative, and the judicial departments. As the traditional explanation has it, the executive enforces the law, the legislature enacts laws and repeals them, and the judiciary interprets the law.
The principle behind this division of power among these three departments is called “separation of powers.” Each department is a co-equal branch, supreme in its own sphere and independent of the other two. That notwithstanding, because they are parts of a whole, each co-equal department is a coordinate branch, which must work together in order to carry out the objectives of the Constitution—the charter which created them in the first place.
Separation of powers suggest checks and balances. Each department must check each other so that no abuses are committed by any branch.
In the American context, the separation of powers among three departments of government was conceived by the drafters of the Constitution of the United States primarily to see to it that no single branch of government gets to be too powerful. In the same context, when one branch of the government gets too powerful, the two other departments must step in and dilute the excess or abusive exercise of power by the over-zealous branch.
To repeat, separation of powers requires each branch to observe due courtesy to each other. This means that one department of the government cannot order the other branches around, in the absence of any mandate from the Constitution to do otherwise.
The recent controversy involving the House of Representatives and a division of the Court of Appeals invites a discussion of the principle of separation of powers.
It will be recalled that six officials of the Ilocos Norte provincial government were summoned by the House to appear before an inquiry into the alleged anomalous purchase of vehicles in the amount of P66.45 million. As expected, the provincial officials appeared at the House inquiry.
When the six officials refused to answer questions from the panel, they were cited in contempt and ordered detained by House Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez. Thus, they were detained beginning May 29.
The six officials questioned their detention by filing a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals. On June 9, the special fourth division of the appellate court, composed of Justices Stephen Cruz, Edwin Sorongon, and Nina Antonino-Valenzuela, ordered the release of the provincial officials provided that they post bail. The House refused to comply with the order of the appellate court.
Several days ago, a furious Alvarez denounced the order of the Court of Appeals on the ground that the appellate court has no jurisdiction over the House of Representatives. He also threatened to dissolve the appellate court and to pursue the disbarment of the three justices.
Alvarez lamented that the Court of Appeals is not co-equal to Congress, and precisely for that reason, the appellate court cannot issue orders to the House. He emphasized that the Court of Appeals is not even mentioned in the Constitution, and is merely a creation of law. In that regard, Alvarez threatened to dissolve the appellate court, apparently by legislating it out of existence.
The speaker also said that Justice Valenzuela should have inhibited herself out of delicadeza because she used to be an associate in the law firm of Estelito Mendoza, a lawyer of one of the provincial officials.
For those who are not in the know, Mendoza is a high-end lawyer whose clientele include the rich and the powerful. He was also the solicitor general during the administration of President Ferdinand Marcos. As solicitor general, Mendoza defended the martial law edicts of President Marcos.
So far, the three justices of the Court of Appeals who issued the controversial order have not commented on the matter.
From all indications, Speaker Alvarez has enough grounds to say that the Court of Appeals is not a co-equal body of the House, precisely because it was not created by the Constitution but by a legislative act back in 1935. This explains his resistance.
Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers and the traditional courtesies that go with it, legal disputes at the highest levels of government, particularly when the President of the Philippines or Congress is directly involved, should be within the exclusive domain of the Supreme Court.
Since the issue in the habeas corpus petition of the provincial officials is purely a legal question—the legality of their detention for contempt of the House—the petition should have been filed directly with the Supreme Court and not with the Court of Appeals. Under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, and in cases where only a question of law is involved. More importantly, it is a co-equal branch of Congress.
The dissolution of the Court of Appeals threatened by Speaker Alvarez is another matter. Under Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution, Congress is prohibited from enacting any law reorganizing the judiciary when such law undermines the security of tenure of judges and justices. Thus, if the law contemplated by Alvarez is for the sole purpose of getting rid of the Court of Appeals, that law is bound to be challenged on constitutional grounds.
As to the plan of Speaker Alvarez to cause the disbarment of the justices of the Court of Appeals involved in the controversial order, pursuing that is his prerogative, but the ultimate authority on the fate of the justices concerned is the Supreme Court. At any rate, if Alvarez files disbarment charges against the three appellate court justices, the ensuing proceedings will be the right forum for the three justices to explain the reasons for the issuance of the controversial directive.
