“A deceased defendant in an independent civil action, or those civil actions instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation such as the law, contracts, quasi-contracts, or quasi-delicts may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the deceased after proper substitution is complied with, as the case may be”
What happens if an accused dies before judgment is rendered in a criminal case?
The criminal case will be dismissed and all the penalties that could have been imposed against the accused will be totally extinguished.
It must be noted that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the crime shall be deemed instituted.
With this, the dismissal of the criminal case will also result in the extinction of the civil liability arising from the offense, if the accused dies after arraignment (Rule 111, Section 4 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure).
Arraignment is when the judge or clerk furnishes the accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty.
The arraignment must be conducted before the court where the complaint or information was filed (Rule 116, Section 1, Rules on Criminal Procedure).
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil action that the offended party may file against the estate of the deceased (Rule 111, Section 4, last paragraph, Rules on Criminal Procedure).
For this author, the same procedure will apply if the respondent dies during the pendency of a criminal complaint against him or her with the Office of the Prosecutor.
However, an independent civil action to recover damages for such offenses as defamation, fraud, physical injuries, refusal or failure of a member of the police force to render aid or protection to any person, or any act or omission causing damage to another either by fault or negligence are by their nature civil actions (Articles 33, 34, and 2176, Civil Code).
These civil actions may be filed by the offended party separate from the criminal action.
A deceased defendant in an independent civil action, or those civil actions instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation such as the law, contracts, quasi-contracts, or quasi-delicts may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the deceased after proper substitution is complied with, as the case may be (Rule 111, Section 4, last paragraph, Rules on Criminal Procedure).
The heirs of the deceased (accused) may be named substitutes without the appointment of an executor or administrator (Rule 111, Section 4 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure).
This provision is similar to Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Comparing the two provisions, the most significant difference between them is the provision in the Rules of Civil Procedure which states that the counsel of the deceased party must inform the court of the death of his client within thirty days from the fact thereof (Rule 3, Section 16).
In actual practice, if the legal representative of the deceased defendant fails to inform the court of his desire to apply Rule 111, Section 4, then Rule 3, Section 16 will apply; the reason being that those civil actions based on other sources of obligation are in reality civil cases, similar to independent civil actions, and are docketed in court as such.
Nonetheless, if an independent civil action or a civil action based on sources other than delict have not yet been filed, the offended party (victim) may file it against the estate or legal representative of the deceased accused, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules (People v. Culas, G.R. No. 211166, July 5, 2017).
In the case of People v. Culas, accused Porferio Culas was convicted with statutory rape by the Supreme Court. Before an entry of judgment could be issued, the Supreme Court received a letter from the Bureau of Corrections informing the former that the accused Culas had died on February 8, 2014, as evidenced by the Certificate of Death (G.R. No. 211166, July 5, 2017).
As a result, the Supreme Court reconsidered and set aside its Resolution dated July 18, 2014 and entered a new one dismissing the criminal case against accused Culas.
Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, accused Culas’ death prior to his final conviction pending appeal renders dismissible the criminal case against him (G.R. No. 211166, July 5, 2017).
Furthermore, Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused. Specifically, the “personal penalties; and… [the] pecuniary penalties… shall be extinguished when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment” (G.R. No. 211166, July 5, 2017).
In the case of Bernardo v. People, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Paz Bernardo guilty of five counts of violation of B.P. 22 because she failed to substantiate her claim of payment.
She was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one year for each count of the offense and ordered her to pay Bumanglag (victim) the amount of P460,000.00, plus interest and penalty charges (G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015).
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction against Bernardo by retaining the pecuniary penalties but deleted the penalty of imprisonment against her.
The CA also did not recognize Bernardo’s claim that she had been denied due process due to the RTC’s order to waive her right to present additional evidence (G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015).
Bernardo further appealed to the Supreme Court.
While pending resolution, Bernardo’s counsel informed the Court of her death on February 3, 2011, and provided the names of her heirs and their address.
In due course, Bernardo’s heirs were ordered to appear as substitutes for her for purposes of determining Bernardo’s civil liability (G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015).
Bernardo’s heirs moved for reconsideration, arguing that Bernardo’s death extinguished her civil liability.
Alternatively, they contended that any civil liability should be settled in a separate civil case. The Supreme Court denied the reconsideration (G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015).
The Supreme Court explained that Bernardo’s civil liability survived her death as it is based on contract.
Moreover, they said that it would be costly, burdensome, and time-consuming to dismiss the present case and require the Bumanglags to file a separate civil action (G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015).
It said: “Thus, it is entirely possible for one to be free from civil ability directly arising from a violation of the penal law and to still be liable civilly based on contract or by laws other than the criminal law. Such civil actions may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the criminal action… [but] the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission” (G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015).
“As a general rule, the death of an accused pending appeal extinguishes her criminal liability and the corresponding civil liability based solely on the offense (delict).
“The death amounts to an acquittal of the accused based on the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence in her favor, which can be overcome only by a finding of guilt — something that death prevents the court from making” (G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015).
In BP 22 cases, the criminal action shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil actions.
Instead of instituting two separate cases, only a single suit is filed and tried.
This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets, which had been packed with BP 22 violations because creditors used the courts as collectors (G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015 citing Hyatt v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp.).
As a necessary consequence of this special rule, the civil liabilities arising from the issuance of a worthless check are deemed instituted in a case for violation of BP 22; the death of Bernardo did not automatically extinguish the action.
“The independent civil liability based on contract… may still be enforced against her [Bernardo’s] estate” (G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015).
“[D]eath absolves the accused from any earthly responsibility arising from the offense – a divine act that no human court can reverse, qualify, much less disregard. The intervention of death of the accused… is an injunction by fate itself so that no criminal liability and… civil liability arising from the offense should be imposed on him” (G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015).
