When news broke out that anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missile systems had been installed on Philippine-claimed reefs on the West Philippine Sea, many were outraged but few were surprised. In many ways the latest development, while truly infuriating, only represents a culmination of virtually unchallenged Chinese militarization of the important sea lane.
Last year marked the beginning of frequent sightings of Chinese warships and aircraft in the Spratly archipelago, which had since been transformed into artificial islands. These include a Jiangkai II-class missile frigate and a Louyang III-class guided-missile destroyer at Panganiban Reef in January; a Type 056 Jiangdao-class missile frigate, the Luzhou 592, also at Panganiban, in June; then finally a Luoyang Jiangwei II-class frigate in November.
Clearly, something was afoot, and it didn’t take a lot of guesswork to conclude that the Chinese were indeed developing a firm and long-term military presence on the islands, most probably in the form of bases. Also frequently sighted are Coast Guard ships, amphibious and sea transport vessels, and combat ships.
And so whenever new satellite images, whether of military transport aircraft or military planes, would be released, they only confirmed what many had long suspected: nearly two years since the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague legally shattered Beijing’s claims over nearly the entirety of the West Philippine Sea, the area’s militarization nevertheless proceeded, and it proceeded with barely a whimper from the Duterte administration.
For instance, asked about the latest and so far most alarming development—the deployment of high-tech weaponry on Philippine territory by the Chinese—both Malacañang and the Department of Foreign Affairs reacted with what can only be described, for all intents and purposes, as an absolutely feeble response: the Palace said it was still trying to verify the report and DFA said it took it seriously but stopped short of actually doing anything.
In stark contrast, Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry reacted immediately and directly by asking Beijing to remove military equipment from South China Sea to maintain ‘peace and responsibility.’
Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo in a bold move to send their strongest message to China sailed aboard a warship in waters near the Natuna chain which similar to the West Philippine Sea, has overlapping interests with China.
Most hit—perhaps because it sends the worst signal—is President Rodrigo Duterte’s chronic refusal to issue any substantial protest “out of fear that it might elicit an adverse reaction from China.” Time and again, he justified his inaction by citing the outsized disparity between Beijing and Manila’s military capabilities, enforcing the false dichotomy that the only possible responses are a declaration of war and absolute silence.
The Duterte administration has notoriously failed to leverage on the 2016 PCA ruling, ostensibly as a sign of goodwill, in exchange for Chinese aid, loans, and investments. (A quick look at the first quarter investment figures already belies this direction, with investment from countries like Japan outweighing Chinese investments by a very wide margin.)
That the missiles are currently not trained toward the direction of the Philippines shouldn’t also be used as an excuse. Collin Koh, a research fellow at Rajaratnam School of International Studies’ Maritime Security Program, said China may eventually use its capabilities for offensive operations.
“Manila may say that when ties are rosy. But when ties turn sour, which can [happen] overnight without warning, those missiles would still remain there to threaten Philippine interests in the South China Sea,” Koh said.
Some senators were similarly aghast at the apparent kowtowing from Manila. Sen. Francis Pangilinan said it would be a “fatal mistake” for the administration to think China or any other country would look after Philippine interests.
“It would be a fatal mistake and detrimental to our sovereignty to think our interests will be defended by other nations,” he was quoted as saying.
Senator Loren Legarda said the latest development should be met “with grave concern.” The militarization of the region—“no matter the perpetrator”—only serves to heighten the risk of hostilities eventually breaking out in the region. Sen. Leila de Lima called on the military to “explain to the people its position on China’s move to put Palawan under the threat of missiles launched from the Spratlys.”
In a recent paper published by independent think tank Stratbase Albert del Rosario Institute, political science expert Renato de Castro cited the revival of a loose security association called the QUAD—composed of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—as a possible “equi-balancing gambit” that can counter Beijing’s so-far unchallenged influence.
This way, instead of outright war, minor powers can foster its diplomatic linkages and economic activities with two or more competing major powers in such a way that influences policy but not enough to suffer any undue external influence. This provides the small state not only the ability to survive but to even advance its own political and strategic interests. Concretely, this provides a strong push back mechanism and a viable alternative to a potentially damaging policy of kowtowing to China.
Whatever track this administration pursues, what is clear is that there are more options beyond the simplistic war-versus-appeasement. At a time when the geopolitical situation in the world is becoming more and more complicated, the kind of diplomacy expected from governments need to be as complex and thoughtful as well.
