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Saturday, November 23, 2024

What really happened at EDSA 1?

"It depends on one's ideological moorings and political inclinations."

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Momentous events such as the People Power Revolt that took place in February 1986 and put an end to the Marcos regime’s more than two decades years in power have tended to be viewed from differing perspectives, depending on one’s ideological moorings and political inclinations.

One point of view looks at the event as the culmination of a long struggle against tyranny and corruption. But there are also those who are convinced that the end of the Marcos era cannot simply be ascribed to people and events that we Filipinos have been told were responsible for the four-day popular uprising that marked a watershed in contemporary Philippine history.

Of those who belong to the latter category, there’s a colleague in journalism and among the top officials during the Arroyo administration, Rigoberto Tiglao, who now writes a column for another daily broadsheet and has sought to shatter what he considers the myths surrounding People Power.

I distinctly remember that last year, he wrote a column on Edsa 1 that’s been included in a collection of his essays entitled “Debunked.” Let me quote at length what he said in this particular column, to make sure that the reader would know exactly what he said:

1) “Cory Aquino had little to do with EDSA I. Ironically, it was Marcos’ legal and military pillar, his longtime defense minister Juan Ponce Enrile who—in a last stand to defend himself and his “RAM boys” from certain doom—was mainly responsible for EDSA I. The events that led to it were triggered by the botched coup attempt by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) cabal of colonels under Enrile’s aegis. It was to have been a classic coup by colonels as happened in Latin America and other parts of the world… As revealed more recently in Juan Ponce Enrile’s biography published last year and articles written by the colonels since 1986, the conspirators after months of planning, decided to attack—boldly or foolishly—Malacañan Palace at 2 a.m. of February 23, 1986, and capture Marcos and his family, for its coup d’etat to take over government.

2) “Only a small faction of the military supported the mutineers. Enrile’s RAM boys consisted mostly of the colonels he had taken under his wing as defense minister. Air Force Commander Vicente Piccio, Army Commander Josephus Ramas and Marine Commandant Tadiar were all loyal to the chain of command. The Philippine Constabulary, surprisingly though, as it was headed for more than a decade by Ramos who was succeeded by his protégé Renato de Villa, was divided in its loyalties. The Marcos military succumbed to the EDSA forces because they realized that they were helpless facing the huge crowds in EDSA: Marcos had given them the categorical order which was impossible to implement: “Disperse the crowds but do not shoot them.

3) “Marcos had negotiated with the US to evacuate him and his family by helicopter from Malacañang to Laoag City, the capital of his home province of Ilocos Norte. We’ll never know what Marcos—who even his archenemies concede was a brilliant strategist—intended to do in the North: To rally his army to defend him and re-take Malacañang, or to negotiate a peaceful retirement?

4) “Under both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution, Corazon Aquino was not qualified to run for president in the 1986 “snap elections”. Both the 1935 and 1973 constitutions specified that a president must be a “resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding the election.” Cory had left the Philippines together with her husband—voluntarily—to live in Boston in 1980… So why didn’t Marcos, a lawyer, and his stable of the country’s brightest legal minds raise this objection to Cory’s candidacy? Perhaps he was confident that there was no way for Cory to win the snap elections. Or perhaps the Americans demanded that he prove his legitimacy in an electoral contest with Aquino’s widow.

5) “Cory’s 1986 electoral campaign was a PR job. Sawyer Miller, an American public-relations and political-strategist firm that would be in the 1980s and 1990s the most expensive and most sought-after outfit in the world after EDSA 1, handled almost in its entirety Cory Aquino’s public performance in the 1986 snap elections. This is confirmed by US documents that Sawyer Miller submitted in compliance with the Foreign Agents Registration Act.”

At a time when facts and “alternative facts” compete for public attention, it’s not easy to tell which is which. But things are getting more interesting from where we sit. Vice President Leni Robredo pointed out during the commemoration of the People Power Revolt in Naga City last Saturday (February 23) that it was not the “Yellows” that made Edsa 1 happen but the unity and the will of the people: “Laging natatatakan ng kulay ang celebration ng (They always mark with color the) Edsa People Power Revolution, but we know this celebration is not about the ‘Yellows’ and other groups but to remember the Filipinos who sacrificed during that time for the freedom that we are enjoying now.”

What do you think?

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