The Supreme Court has ruled the Senate has no power to indefinitely detain a person cited in contempt during its legislative inquiry.
In a 21-page en banc decision written by Associate Justice Alexander Gesmundo, the SC unanimously resolved that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt of the Senate should only last until the termination of the legislative investigation.
The high court stressed the need to “strike a balance” between the interest of the Senate and the rights of persons cited in contempt during its legislative inquiries.
“Accordingly, as long as there is a legitimate legislative inquiry, then the inherent power of contempt by the Senate may be properly exercised. Conversely, once the said legislative inquiry concludes, the exercise of the inherent power of contempt ceases and there is no more genuine necessity to penalize the detained witness,” the SC ruled.
The tribunal stressed that legislative inquiry in aid of legislation terminated upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report or upon the expiration of one Congress.
The SC laid down this ruling when it resolved last July 3, 2018 the petition of Aegis Juris fraternity leader Arvin Balag who was among 11 members of the Aegis Juris fraternity indicted for violation of Republic Act 8049 or the Anti-Hazing Law, in connection with the fatal hazing of University of Santo Tomas law student Horatio “Atio” del Castillo IV.
On Oct. 25, 2017, Balag filed a petition before the SC after senators at a joint inquiry on the del Castillo case ordered him detained in Senate premises for being uncooperative.
Balag repeatedly invoked his right against self-incrimination even when asked with simple questions to established points of fact.
The SC ordered Balag’s “interim release,” two months after.
In its decision, the high court declared Balag’s petition questioning the legality of his detention by the Senate moot and academic, but it nonetheless resolved what it considered as “a critical and decisive issue,” particularly the duration of the detention for a contempt ordered by the Senate.
“This issue must be threshed out as the Senate’s exercise of its power of contempt without a definite period is capable of repetition,” the SC noted.
“Moreover, the indefinite detention of persons cited in contempt impairs their constitutional right to liberty. Thus, paramount public interest requires the Court to determine such issue to ensure that the constitutional rights of the persons appearing before a legislative inquiry of the Senate are protected,” the high court emphasized.
The tribunal noted that a previous ruling in Arnault v. Nazareno held that the Senate “is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of Congress or of the House of Representatives.
It also held that there was no limit as to the time that the Senate can exercise it power to cite a person in contempt and acknowledged the possibility that the Senate might detain a witness for life being a continuing body.
However, the Court then still refused to limit the period of imprisonment under the power of contempt of the Senate saying that legislative functions may still be performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearings relative to any proposed legislation.
In Balag’s case, the SC found “a genuine necessity” to place a limitation on the period of imprisonment that might be imposed by the Senate, citing Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution which obliges Congress to respect persons appearing in its inquiry in aid of legislation.
“While there is a presumption of regularity that the Senate will not gravely abuse its power of contempt, there is still a lingering and unavoidable possibility of indefinite imprisonment of witnesses as long as there is no specific period of detention, which is certainly not contemplated and envisioned by the Constitution,” the Court stressed.
Nonetheless, the SC said that if Congress would want to supplement its power of contempt by extending the period of imprisonment beyond the conduct of its legislative inquiry then it can enact a law or amend the existing law for such.
